Agricultural economists' research on price forecasting and marketing strategies has been used little by those in the real world. We argue that fresh approaches to research are needed. First, we argue that we need to adopt a new theoretical paradigm, noisy rational expectations. This paradigm suggests that gains from using price forecasting models with public data or from using a marketing strategy are not impossible, but any gains are likely to be small. We need to conduct falsification tests; to perform confirmation and replication; to adjust research to reflect structural changes, such as increased contracting; and always to conduct statistical tests. We also provide a modest agenda for changing our research and extension programs.
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There is a growing perception that agricultural vice ranked twelfth out of nineteen information economists' research on price forecasting and mar-sources used by producers for marketing decisions, keting strategies is of limited relevance to real-behind farm magazines, commercial newsletters, world applications. 1 For example, this concern has and marketing consultants. Other studies report been voiced repeatedly by industry representatives similar findings (e.g., Smith) . This suggests a genattending the NCR-134 Conference on Applied eral irrelevance of the price forecasting and marCommodity Price Analysis, Forecasting, and Mar-keting strategies information that researchers proket Risk Management. Similar concerns have been vide to extension specialists. raised in numerous other forums with respect to A number of explanations for the apparent lack agricultural economics research in general (e.g., of practical relevance have been offered. Bromley Armbruster; Robison and Colyer) .
suggests an agency problem exists between society The purpose of price forecasting and marketing and agricultural economics researchers. That is, strategies research should be to increase social the incentives facing agricultural economics rewelfare through improved resource allocation. searchers fail to elicit the types of research that There is little direct evidence whether our research society desires. In a similar vein, Robison and Coldoes or does not increase welfare. We are aware of yer suggest that professional certification through only two studies that find direct evidence favoring peer-reviewed publication is overemphasized. price forecasting. Freebairn and Antonovitz and Bonnen argues that our profession has drifted toRoe report substantial welfare gains to improved wards "anti-empiricism." Finally, Robison and price forecasts, but as Irwin notes, the analyses Colyer suggest that publication pressures and cost likely overstate the improvement because private efficiencies contribute to an overemphasis on tests information is ignored.
with secondary data in a standardized format. Most importantly, if our research is to increase
In sum, the evidence is persuasive that a probsocial welfare, then it needs to be used. The avail-lem exists with respect to the relevance of price able evidence is quite troubling. Batte, Schnitkey, forecasting and marketing strategies research. In and Jones found the Cooperative Extension Ser-this paper, we focus on ways of improving the relevance of this research. on what we are doing wrong, not what we are doing right. Undoubtedly, there are many exam-yet none of the deviations seems large enough for ples of practical research on price forecasting and a producer to exploit profitably. marketing strategies. We intentionally focus on the The rational expectations model, however, asproblems and take firm positions in order to pro-sumes too much knowledge on the part of producvoke thought. It is our view that the problems can ers. First, the rational expectations model requires be solved, not individually, but only through joint that producers know the true underlying parameaction. We hope this paper contributes in some ters of the supply and demand functions. The small way to moving forward. mechanism by which they learn these parameters is not specified. Second, the rational expectations model assumes that information is costless. Hence, AiFramework producers incur no costs as they gather and analyze An Alternative Theoretical Frameworkinformation information.
A "noisy" rational expectations model provides As noted earlier, the purpose of price forecasting a framework with more realistic assumptions about and marketing strategies research should be to im-learning and the cost of information. Models in prove social welfare through improved resource this literature assume producers have rational exallocations. However, expectational and informa-pectations but must learn model parameters and tional assumptions greatly influence our view of purchase information. This opens the door again to whether we can in fact accomplish this goal. We a theoretical justification of public research on believe agricultural economists have been trapped price forecasting and marketing strategies. Howbetween two opposing models, one that assumes ever, a noisy rational expectations model provides too little on the part of producers and one that a higher "hurdle" for justifying public expendiassumes too much. We suggest an alternative theo-tures than do traditional cobweb models. In a retical framework that lands someplace in between noisy rational expectations equilibrium, social the two traditional methods.
welfare depends on the speed of convergence toThe traditional justification for public programs ward the rational expectations equilibrium. All in this area is based on the assumption of naive, else constant, total social loss will be smaller the backward-looking (cobweb) price expectations on faster a rational expectations equilibrium is the part of producers (Irwin). Because of the naive achieved (Stein 1992a (Stein , 1992b . To determine expectations, producers make systematic forecast-whether price forecasting and marketing strategies ing errors, which in turn result in misallocations of research has social value, we must ascertain resources. Hence, social welfare can be increased whether the research significantly speeds converby providing producers with more forward-looking gence to equilibrium in agricultural markets. forecasts and marketing strategies.
Public research may increase the speed of conIn recent years, a popular assumption has been vergence to a rational expectations equilibrium by that producers form rational expectations (Muth). educating producers regarding the structure and Rational expectations imply that producers use all parameters of the underlying economic model and available information when making forecasts and prospective economic conditions. This is consisdo not make systematic mistakes. If producers tent with the long-held view that a vital aspect of have rational expectations, price forecasting and public situation and outlook programs is economic marketing strategies research cannot improve so-education. Further, public research may be more cial welfare. Resources spent on public research valuable where active futures and options markets represent a net social loss. Hence, if producers do not exist. Stein argues that the existence of have rational expectations, then research to im-these markets substantially lowers the cost of tradprove forecasts is unnecessary, as producers al-ing, which allows firms to profit more readily from ready make the best possible forecasts and market-their private information. This in turn speeds coning decisions. The rational expectations model is vergence to a rational expectations equilibrium. often referred to in the finance literature as the Hence, it can be hypothesized that public research efficient market hypothesis (Fama) .
is more valuable in markets without futures and Clearly, the rational expectations model pro-options trading. vides a strong theoretical challenge to continued To summarize, the benchmark for public supfunding of public research on price forecasting and port of our research should be whether the research marketing strategies. Despite mixed empirical ev-increases the speed of convergence toward a ratioidence (e.g., Irwin and Thraen), the rational expectations assumption is the most logical expectations assumption. Numerous deviations from mar-nal expectations equilibrium. This new benchmark summarizes data from a study by Martines and presents a high, yet realistic, standard for research Irwin. The recommended corn hedge ratios for the on price forecasting and marketing strategies.
1993 preharvest period are plotted for six private market advisory services. These hedge ratios are typically less than 0.50. There is substantial variCritical Applied Research Issues ation across time in the individual recommendations, and there is significant variation across adThe noisy rational expectations model provides visors. only a broad framework for valuing and conceptuThis evidence can be compared with the optimal alizing price forecasting and marketing strategies hedge ratios typically estimated by agricultural research. The individual researcher must provide economists. For example, at the 1992 NCR-134 the detailed empirical evidence. The empirical ev-Conference, papers were presented estimating opidence, however, requires that four critical issues timal or minimum variance hedge ratios of 0.75-be addressed: (1) confronting models with data on 1.02 (Norvell and Leuthold; Lence, Kimle, and actual producer behavior, (2) confirming applied Hayenga). Similar ratios can be found in a number research results, (3) carefully studying the under-of other studies. Tomek (1987) argues that this gap lying structure of agricultural markets, and (4) can be explained by considering hedging costs and carefully conducting significance tests.
yield risk, but we really do not know. Peck and Nahmias have shown that minimum variance hedge ratios cannot explain the changes in the level Confronting Models of hedging over time of flour mills. Since recommendations of the current theory of hedging do not To produce relevant applied research on price fore-match what people really do, a philosophy of scicasting and marketing strategies, we must first ence such as Friedman's positivism or Popper's confront our models with micro-level data on the falsificationism (see Blaug) would say that our curbehavior of participants in agricultural markets. rent theory of hedging can be rejected. Unfortunately, in many instances, we have almost
Another area where models need to be contotally abandoned this practice. Instead, we build fronted with actual data on producer behavior is more sophisticated and complex models and price expectations. Irwin and Thraen note that "test" them using secondary data. There are un-there is little direct evidence on the way producers doubtedly rational reasons for our behavior. As form price expectations. We know even less about Robison and Colyer point out, such confrontation how producers process and evaluate information. is expensive because it requires careful collection Clearly, there are many challenges to be faced. of primary data.
An example of sterile ("nonconfrontational") Confirming Results modeling is optimal hedging modeling. The gap between actual practice and research results is laree anya measure Two recent studies illustrate If applied research results are to be practically rellarge by any measure. Two recent studies illustrate r evant, they must be reliable. But how can we esthe problem. Table I presents findings from a tablish reliability? There are several approaches to study by Schroeder and Goodwin that shows pro-this issue, but we concur with Tomek (1993) that ducers tend to forward price very little (less than t b ar h i i r the best approach is independent confirmation by 20%) and when they do, they usually use forward the esarc is isue is thoro y (and we other researchers. This issue is thoroughly (and we contracts rather than futures contracts. Figure 1 might found as a result of confirmation or replication soybean producers are implied to have adaptive efforts. Tomek suggests four reasons for divergent expectations, naive expectations, perfect foresight, results: (1) differences in models, (2) differences or rational expectations. in data, (3) use of alternative estimators, and (4) We currently devote almost zero resources to variations in the way results are used and analyzed. independent confirmation and replication of previSubstantial knowledge about reliability can be ous research results. It is possible to reach the degained by understanding sensitivities to the above pressing conclusion that we do not attempt such four factors.
tasks because we know that no one actually uses Surely, few areas exist where reliability is more our research results! Otherwise, we would be important than in formulating price forecasts and much more concerned with the issue. Confirmamarketing strategies. Unfortunately, the limited tion and replication needs to be a standard part of available evidence suggests our research results are our research on price forecasting and marketing highly fragile. Tomek demonstrates this for two strategies. models of meat demand. Irwin and Thraen review St l a number of econometric rational expectations models and find a tremendous variation in results. Another important applied issue resides in the For example, depending on the study examined, structural assumptions that underlie our research.
Relevant and reliable research has to reflect to a a large number of observations. Yet, many studies reasonable degree the underlying structure of ag-have been and still are conducted with few obserricultural markets. The structure of these markets vations. Only when significance tests are included has been evolving over the entire time-span that does it become obvious that too few degrees of agricultural economists have been examining freedom are available. Even when the evaluation is them. However, the pace of structural change ap-based on economic criteria such as trading profits, pears to be quickening in many markets, especially significance tests are still needed. livestock. Many observers argue that even faster
The early 1980s saw a rush of literature on price change is in store.
forecasting models (e.g., Brandt and Bessler). Much of our research, particularly on marketing This literature produced inconsistent conclusions strategies, ignores the large structural changes that with autoregressive integrated moving average have occurred and will likely continue to occur in models (ARIMA) sometimes outperforming structhe future. We simply have not recognized the tural econometric models and sometimes not. A changing reality of agricultural marketing and common convention was to use twelve out-ofseem to be trapped in a 1950s view of agricultural sample observations in evaluations. Significance markets. Today agricultural markets are becoming tests such as those of Ashley, Granger, and much more vertically integrated.
Schmalensee or Henriksson and Merton have With the evolution to more vertically integrated shown that twelve observations are not enough. markets, trade in centralized, terminal markets is Some of the recent research on price forecasting replaced by individually negotiated contracts. includes significance tests and more than twelve Hence, the economics of contracts takes center out-of-sample observations (e.g., Goodwin). Unstage. Research in this area traditionally has been fortunately, most recent studies also fail to find conducted by agricultural economists with an in-significant differences. Thus, even more degrees terest in industrial organization. However, this of freedom may be needed. Most price forecasting area need not and should not be the exclusive do-studies use prices of hogs or cattle where quarterly main of these individuals. Agricultural economists or monthly observations are available. Usually interested in marketing strategies must take an ac-with grains, only one observation per year is availtive interest in this area, or risk even further irrel-able. evance to a significant group of participants in agAnderson and Mapp report the frustration of exricultural markets.
tension economists who are asked to recommend A substantial body of theory is available to marketing strategies when only a few annual obguide new empirical research into agricultural con-servations are available. Current choices are to tract economics. One strand of this literature deals conduct no significance tests 5 (Pfeiffer, Sandell, with information asymmetries and principal-agent and Kendrick) or to make conclusions even when problems. Other strands deal explicitly with the significant differences are not found (Chen, Elam, bargaining process and the outcome in terms of and Ethridge). The tests are right. The noisy ratiocontract terms. This area is in reality a substantial nal expectations model says the effects are likely to portion of the new theoretical work done in eco-be small and that large numbers of observations nomics over the last twenty years. Sheldon pro-would be needed to find statistical significance. vides an excellent introduction to the theory in this One way of obtaining more observations is pooling area and potential applications in agriculture. across commodities and locations. A universal strategy would need to reflect the realities deSignificance Testing scribed by Benirschka and Binkley, that firms close to the market should store grain for shorter Another problem is that much of our research on time periods than those located farther away from marketing strategies and to a lesser extent price the market. The failure to subject research on marforecasting is just not very good. 4 Noisy rational keting strategies to significance testing has led to expectations theory suggests that the advantages of false conclusions. Fortunately, losses are not high, one marketing strategy over another or one price since under noisy rational expectations theory, one forecasting model over another are likely small. strategy should be almost as good as another. Thus, detecting differences in models may require 5 An additional problem with many marketing strategy results is that 4 More of the price forecasting work has been done by researchers and they are in sample. In such cases, standard significance levels need to be has been subjected to the journal peer review process. Less of the maradjusted with an approach such as Bonferroni's method (Milliken and keting strategy literature is peer reviewed which may explain its inadeJohnson, 33-34), or a joint test of significance used, or out-of-sample quate statistical tests, tests conducted.
A Modest Agenda comes the foundation of our theoretical models, then it should also be the foundation of our mar-A reasonable response to the previous discussion is keting education programs. Therefore, we will to ask, "If these issues are so important, why speculate on the implications of noisy rational exaren't we researching them?" This is a particularly pectations theory for marketing education progood question, given that we are both favorably grams. disposed to an efficient market view of the world.
To begin, producers should be considered uninWe are convinced there is a "rational" explana-formed traders since they do not have access to any tion for our behavior. A number of writers (e.g., special source of information. Producers are atLeontief; Tomek 1993; Robison and Colyer) point tempting to become informed traders by purchasto two key factors: costs and incentives.
ing information. In a noisy rational expectations First, solving each of the applied research issues equilibrium, the returns to information equal the is costly, in terms of both time and direct costs. cost of the information. Further, producers receive Collection of primary data generally is costly, as is information with a lag and have little economies of the process of confirming the results of previous size in gathering information. These two difficulstudies. Second, the incentives faced by agricul-ties can be overcome by hiring a marketing advitural economists at land grant universities typically sory service, but still theory suggests it is a breakwork against research on some applied problems. even proposition (after adjusting for costs and The current incentive structure rewards publication risk). quantity, which is most easily accomplished with This new theory, unlike pure rational expectasophisticated and "innovative" models tested on tions, does not say that trying to forecast prices is secondary data. a waste of time. It says that useful ex ante foreWhile easy solutions do not exist, we do think casting is possible only when superior information there are useful incremental actions that can be is obtained. The theory also says that a successful, taken collectively. As reviewers, we have the informed trader must obtain and act upon informapower to modify incentives. tion before other traders do if it is to be useful. We also think there are some underutilized Extension cannot match the speed of a marketing sources of primary data. For example, consider the consultant that does the actual trading. Therefore, case of private market advisory services. These extension should move away from predicting services are now the most important source of mar-prices. 6 Many extension programs have already keting information to producers (survey after sur-done this to varying degrees. vey documents this). Many have records going Extension definitely has a role in evaluating back a number of years. While they will not re-market advisory services and, in some cases, proplace direct evidence on hedging behavior, their viding information and analyses to these services. recommendations represent a rich source of data There is also still a potential place for an extension on marketing behavior. Presumably, since produc-outlook program that transforms a naive producer ers pay for the information, they use it.
into a rational one. Such an outlook program might These services have almost no connection to ag-rely on the futures market to obtain price forecasts. ricultural economists and their research. Agricul-The program would emphasize education, e.g., tural economists have likely ignored them because how to derive the price forecasts implicit in futures of the perceived difficulty in gathering primary prices and why these implicit price forecasts are data. Maybe the services ignore us because they rational. It could also inform producers of the find our research completely irrelevant. known tendencies to deviate from a random walk, such as the tendency of daily and weekly cash prices to exhibit positive autocorrelation. Such an Extension Programs outlook program might increase the economic efficiency of production decisions. Before concluding, we offer some observations on Extension should also put greater emphasis on extension programs in price forecasting and mar-managing risk. As noted above, the problem is that keting strategies. Extension economists may pro-much of our risk management research seems to be vide inconsistent information because of the incon-of little use to producers. Anderson and Mapp arsistently of their underlying models. Some rely on conceptual models with naive expectations, while others employ models with rational expectations.
The available empirical evidence supports this conclusion as well.
Weii* argued e r tt bh of Allen argues that outlook forecasts are more accurate than naive or We argued earlier that both of these models are too simple trend forecasts, but generally worse than a range of other methextreme. If noisy rational expectations theory be-ods.
gue that most of our risk models are so complex this is an exciting time to be a price analysis and that producers cannot use them. Eales et al. found marketing researcher. There are new and important that producers consistently underestimate the vari-questions that need to be addressed. There are new ance of their price forecasts. We can help them theories that can be used to guide the research. We better determine risk levels. Such information do not have to simply apply traditional theory and could help producers determine when to hedge. methods. Let's get started! Our current models which assume hedging is costless are obviously inadequate. We must inform producers about the costs of using forward con-References tracts, futures, and options. If producers are indeed naive traders, then producers should not hedge un-Allen, P. Geoffrey. "Economic Forecasting in Agriculture." less they are willing to accept a smaller profit per 
